A Divided ICJ Lowers the Standard for Proving Genocidal Intent

Peace Palace, seat of the International Court of Justice. Photo: Shutterstock

Six of the Fifteen ICJ Judges are Heavily Critical of the Majority Decision

By Andrew Tucker, Director General The Hague Initiative for International Co-operation 

Today, by nine votes to six, the International Court of Justice found that Myanmar committed genocide against the Rohingya of northern Rakhine State. 

For the past months, we have been warning that the Court would lower the threshold for proving genocidal intent, with serious consequences for Western militaries engaged in confronting terror. Unfortunately we were right. 

Genocide is “the crime of crimes”. It entails “a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind”. The distinctive character of genocide derives not from the gravity, scale or brutality of the underlying acts, but from the purpose with which those acts must be committed: the specific intent to bring about the physical or biological destruction, in whole or in part, of a protected group as such. It is this special mental element that sets genocide apart from other grave violations of international law. 

All judges acknowledge the gravity of the 2017 events in Myanmar: executions of men and boys, gang rape, the killing of young children, villages burned and a population driven from its land. Not even the six dissenting judges deny this. Their joint opinion is “fully convinced” that killings, serious harm and sexual violence took place, and most of the minority still found Myanmar in breach of other obligations under the Genocide Convention. The division is not about whether atrocities occurred, but about how genocide is proved.

Because States rarely announce it, the Court allows intent to be proven by inference from a pattern of conduct, but only where it is “the only reasonable inference” that can be drawn from the pattern of conduct. That was the test in Bosnia (2007) and Croatia (2015), where the Court held that driving out the Croat population remained a reasonable alternative explanation, and declined to find genocide.

While claiming to remain faithful to the Court’s own jurisprudence, the majority actually splits the inquiry into two stages and shifts the burden of proof. It asks: is genocide a reasonable inference, and then requires the party defending itself to prove that any alternative explanation, such as forced displacement or collective punishment, accounts for the totality of the evidence. It treats purposes that are “compatible” with genocidal intent as no longer competing with it. 

According to the six minority judges, the Court is departing from its own jurisprudence. It is lowering the standard required to prove genocidal intent – breaching the Court’s own practice that requires “very particular reasons” to depart from settled case law. Judge ad hoc Kress calls it “a significant and unacknowledged departure”. The majority itself cannot agree: President Iwasawa insists nothing has changed, while Judge Charlesworth defends the method as new and better suited to State intent.

The six dissenting judges explain how the Court has shifted the burden of proof:

“… the distinction between the findings of genocidal intent being a reasonable inference and being the only reasonable inference is not only artificial but also tends to implicitly shift the burden on the respondent to show that the existence of genocidal intent was not the only reasonable inference to be drawn, because at least one other inference is reasonable. Unfortunately, the reasoning in the Judgment reveals how easily this possibility can materialize.”

In deciding that Myanmar has failed to prove it did not have genocidal intent, the majority discounted factors that weighed heavily in Croatia: the relative scale of killing (some 10,000 deaths, about 1.2 per cent of the targeted group) and the opportunities to destroy that were left unused.

The evidence raises parallel concerns. The Court made no site visit, and the UN Fact-Finding Mission had no access to northern Rakhine State. Live witnesses spoke to three of some 509 Rohingya villages. Extending the finding to the whole region depended on UN and NGO material, including unsigned summaries of a kind the court in Croatia gave no weight. The Mission’s reliability was accepted on its described methodology, not its underlying records. Of 64 direct witness statements, 34 recorded earlier interviews by other organisations. Myanmar’s military reports required corroboration; UN findings often did not. Myanmar’s refusal to cooperate with UN bodies, which the Court accepted was not obligatory, was then counted against it. Corroboration presupposes independent sources. A holistic assessment cannot create reliability that the evidence lacks.

Of concern for future NATO and other multinational military operations, the Court states that compliance with IHL “does not exclude conduct from the scope of the Genocide Convention” (para. 305). This risks giving the ICJ an unwarranted power to micromanage armed conflict, including urban warfare against terrorists and other non-State armed groups.

An ICJ judgment is not only a verdict in a particular case but a template. Its propositions will be used in future cases: that genocidal intent may coexist with legitimate military objectives; that an alternative explanation must account for everything; that UN reports compiled without access can carry decisive weight; and that a State can breach the duty to prevent genocide without any finding that genocide occurred, reversing Bosnia. These are all the contested questions in pending cases. 

The judges saw the consequences. Judge Nolte warns that the reasoning “will open the Court to political pressure in the future”. Judge Tomka expects the significance of the prevention reversal to become clearer “possibly in the rather near future”.

A demanding standard for genocide is not a loophole for perpetrators. War crimes and crimes against humanity remain grave and prosecutable, and the dissent accepted that serious violations occurred here. The word “genocide” carries its unique moral and legal force precisely because it is reserved for what can be proven to the highest standard. A test loosened for a sympathetic case cannot be tightened for an unsympathetic one. If the Court wishes to change the law of genocide, it should say so openly and give its reasons. It has failed to do so. 

Legal certainty is not opposed to justice for victims. It is a condition of it.

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