By: Raouf Leeraar, Policy Director, Israel Allies Foundation Europe
Introduction
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has emerged as one of the most influential instruments of Iranian state power beyond the Middle East. While much of the scholarly and policy debate has focused on the IRGC’s activities in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, evidence shows that the organization has developed a sophisticated operational presence in Europe. Rather than relying on direct military or intelligence operations, the IRGC increasingly operates within what can be described as the grey zone. This zone is a space between war and peace where hostile actions are conducted below the threshold of proof and without clear attribution.
The attractiveness of the grey zone
Grey zone activities are attractive to authoritarian states because they enable strategic objectives to be pursued while minimizing political and legal consequences. In the European context, the IRGC has demonstrated an ability to combine covert violence, criminal intermediaries, influence networks, and ideological outreach into a single operational framework. This hybrid approach challenges traditional European legal systems, which are largely designed to address direct responsibility, clearly identifiable perpetrators, and overt acts of aggression.
The IRGC’s hard-power activities in Europe illustrate this challenge. During the 1980s and 1990s, IRGC-linked actors were frequently associated with direct operations against dissidents living in exile. The assassinations of Iranian opposition figures in Austria, including Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou in 1989, reflected a model of direct state involvement. In recent years, however, operational methods have evolved. Rather than deploying Iranian operatives directly, investigations across Europe increasingly point to the use of criminal intermediaries and organized crime networks. This approach creates distance between the Iranian state and the act itself, complicating attribution and reducing the political costs of exposure.
Case study: The Netherlands
The Netherlands provides a particularly instructive case study. Multiple attacks against Iranian dissidents have been linked by Dutch authorities to networks operating on behalf of Iranian interests. These incidents demonstrate a pattern in which targets are identified by Iranian intelligence structures, logistical arrangements are facilitated through criminal networks, and low-level criminal actors carry out the operation in return for money. Such a model exemplifies the grey-zone environment: state-directed objectives are pursued through non-state actors, thereby obscuring responsibility and complicating prosecution.
Soft power strategies undermine democratic stability
Yet focusing exclusively on violence risks overlooking the broader strategic logic of IRGC activities. The organization does not rely solely on coercive methods. It also seeks influence through religious, educational, and cultural networks thatshape narratives, build social capital, and cultivate long-term relationships. These activities constitute a form of soft power that operates alongside more coercive instruments.
Importantly, these institutions should not automatically be viewed as extensions of the IRGC. However, scholars of foreign influence operations have repeatedly demonstrated that authoritarian states often utilize a broad ecosystem of affiliated organizations to advance strategic objectives. The challenge for European governments is therefore not merely identifying direct control, but understanding how influence networks can create opportunities for leverage, recruitment, narrative dissemination, and community mobilization.
This leads to what I term the Converging Hybrid Model (CHM). Rather than treating hard and soft power as separate instruments, the IRGC increasingly integrates them into a unified strategy. Covert operations create pressure and intimidation, while influence networks cultivate legitimacy, access, and resilience. Together, these tools allow the organization to adapt to local circumstances and exploit vulnerabilities within democratic societies.
Implications for European security
The implications for European security policy are significant. Existing legal frameworks remain largely grounded in assumptions of direct attribution and identifiable state actors. Grey-zone activities deliberately undermine these assumptions. Consequently, European states must consider legal reforms that address indirect responsibility, improve coordination between intelligence and criminal justice institutions, and develop more sophisticated mechanisms for monitoring foreign influence operations.
The IRGC’s activities in Europe should therefore be understood not as isolated incidents, but as components of a broader strategic approach. By combining proxy violence, criminal networks, ideological influence, and social penetration, the organization operates in a space where traditional distinctions between domestic security, foreign policy, and criminal justice become increasingly blurred. Recognizing and responding to this reality will be essential if European democracies are to protect both their security and the integrity of their political institutions.
Sources:
- European Parliament, Resolution on the IRGC (2023)
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0016_EN.html - Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Annual Reports
https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/jaarverslagen - United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps - Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, IRGC and Quds Force Studies
https://ctc.westpoint.edu - International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran’s Networks of Influence
https://www.iiss.org - European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Iran and European Security
https://ecfr.eu/topic/iran/ - The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), Grey Zone Conflict Research
https://hcss.nl - RAND Corporation, Understanding Grey Zone Conflict
https://www.rand.org/topics/gray-zone.html
