One year after snapback, states must act to stop Iran’s nuclear advance where the Security Council cannot.
By Alessandro Spinillo and Prof Greg Rose
In October 2026, the US Department of State released a Joint Statement marking one year since the snapback of UN sanctions on Iran. It recalls that six Security Council resolutions – 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010) -‘snapped back’ into force. The snapback process was initiated by France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3), in response to Iran’s persistent non-performance of its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) against Iranian of nuclear weapons proliferation.
The 2026 Joint Statement was adopted by 56 participants in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is a multilateral partnership designed to prevent illegal trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The PSI was adopted in 2003, led by the USA, and is endorsed by 116 countries. Subject to international legal frameworks, such as the Law of the Sea, the partners countries commit to interdict and search vessels and vehicles suspected of trafficking in WMD-related cargo.
The 2026 PSI Joint Statement fully aligns with the course thinc. has advocated from the outset. In August 2025, thinc. published a legal-policy briefing describing the legal procedure for invoking the snapback mechanism under UNSCR 2231 (2015) and making the case for its use. The E3 triggered the snapback mechanism on 28 August 2025, and the six Security Council resolutions were reinstated on 27 September 2025.
Three days later, thinc. released a brief calling for the urgent reconstitution of the 1737 Sanctions Committee and its Panel of Experts under the JCPOA, which was designed to take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of sanctions measures. That call remains unanswered. Owing to the stalemate in the Security Council, the Committee has no Chair and no Panel of Experts has been appointed. On 17 September 2026, Russia and China vetoed a draft resolution that would have extended the Panel’s mandate until September 2027.
In the 2026 PSI Joint Statement, participants commit to continue taking measures to prevent the transfer to Iran of items that could contribute to proliferation-sensitive WMD activities or delivery systems, and to uphold the restrictions on arms transfers to or from Iran. They urge all UN Member States to implement these resolutions. By committing participants to national implementation and interdiction, the 2026 PSI Joint Statement addresses the gap left by the Security Council.
Within the PSI framework, 21 states form an Operational Experts Group that promotes the effectiveness of the PSI, by contributing customs, law enforcement, military and other security experts and assets to interdiction exercises to improve capacity to combat the proliferation of WMDs. The 2026 Joint Statement leverages the PSI, its Operational Experts Group individual and national implementation efforts to counter Iranian proliferation efforts, despite the absence of the JCPOA Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts.
Meanwhile, international attention has turned to Iranian attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and, although these are serious threats, they should not obscure the central danger: Iran’s nuclear programme and its continuing effort to advance towards nuclear weapons capability, which remain an urgent threat against international peace and security.
On 9 September 2026, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution reporting Iran to the Security Council for breaching its non-proliferation obligations, the first such step in 20 years. The IAEA Director-General told the Board that the Agency has been completely blind regarding Iran’s programme since at least June 2025. By the IAEA’s estimate, Iran held 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% before the US-Israeli strikes, enough for ten nuclear weapons if enriched further. On 10 September, the Director-General confirmed that remote imagery showed new Iranian activity at Pickaxe Mountain, a fortified underground site just south of the Natanz enrichment plant, that the Agency has yet to inspect. The IAEA’s referral now rests before a Security Council whose sanctions machinery has been paralysed by Russia and China.
States mut not wait for Security Council action. They must implement the reinstated Security Council resolutions fully and without delay and act together, as the PSI 2026 Joint Statement indicates, to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
